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IV. 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals (1987) 
provides: 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding 
challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant 
intents to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record 
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987) provides in 
pertinent part: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
in pertinent part: 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law. 
v. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The State charged Ms. Jiminez with assault by a prisoner, 
a third degree felony. The trial court dismissed the charge based 
on defendant's motion. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26(c)(1) (1953 as amended) 
and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
vi. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Should the decision of the trial court to dismiss the 
charge of Assault by a Prisoner based on the State's failure to 
preserve a videotape of the incident be affirmed on appeal? 
vii. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
JESSIE JIMINEZ, : Case No. 870399-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the State from an Order of Dismissal 
of a charge of Assault by a Prisoner, a Third Degree Felony, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1953 as amended), entered on September 9, 
1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Frank G, Noel, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 14, 1987, Jessie Jiminez was arrested on the 
charge of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and transported to 
the Salt Lake County Jail by police officers (R. 15-17). The State 
alleged that during the booking process, Ms. Jiminez assaulted the 
arresting officer by attempting to kick him in the stomach (R. 16, 
17, 35). 
A preliminary hearing on the charge of assault by a 
prisoner was held in circuit court on June 11, 1987 (R. 04) Shortly 
thereafter, on July 2, 1987, defense counsel filed a motion to 
compel further discovery, requesting that the court order the state 
to provide Ms. Jiminez with ff[a]ny video tapes taken of the alleged 
incident" (R. 21). A minute entry dated July 31, 1987, shows that a 
prosecutor other than the prosecutor assigned to the case appeared 
and informed the Court that the state did not have a video (R. 24). 
Thereafter, on August 7, 1987, the State responded in writing to Ms. 
Jiminez1 request for additional discovery, stating in pertinent part: 
The video tape of all bookings, including this 
incident was recycled after approximately 72 hours. 
This is a normal procedure used at the Salt Lake 
County Jail. The tape of the incident was erased 
because no request was made to retain the tape and 
absent such a request the tape is always recycled. 
The tape was not intentionally erased or destroyed. 
(R. 28, See Addendum A). 
On August 13, 1987, Ms. Jiminez, by and through counsel, 
filed a Memorandum in support of her Motion to Dismiss the charge of 
Assault on a police officer (R. 35-38). The state responded in a 
Memorandum filed August 19, 1987 and stated, for the first time in 
the record before the Court, that it was "uncertain whether or not 
the incident was in fact videotaped by the equipment that was 
operating at the Salt Lake County Jail" (R. 32). 
After a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss for failure to 
preserve evidence held on August 21, 1987, the Honorable Frank G. 
Noel ordered: 
that the charge of Assault by a Prisoner . . . is 
dismissed for the reason that the state failed to 
retain any videotape of the incident at the Salt 
Lake County Jail . . . 
(R. 40-41, See Addendum B) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The record before this Court establishes that the trial 
court had ample evidence to support a finding that a videotape of 
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the incident was taken and later destroyed. Destruction of the 
videotape violated Ms. Jiminez' due process rights under the Utah 
and United States Constitutions since the videotape would have been 
dispositive of the issue whether Ms. Jiminez committed the crime of 
Assault by a Prisoner, and the videotape was therefore material to 
the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT: THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS 
THE CHARGE OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER BASED 
ON THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. 
A. THE FINDING OF FACT BY THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT A VIDEOTAPE OF THE INCIDENT EXISTED 
WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The findings and conclusions of the trial court will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule 
52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; State v. DePlonty, 73 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 16 (December 31, 1987). 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987) 
provides in pertinent part: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
Rule 52(a) applies in criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-26(g) (1953 as amended) and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 81(e) (1953 as amended). State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 
(Utah 1987). 
This Court has acknowledged that the Court of 
Appeals presumes the findings of fact of the trial 
court to be correct. 
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It is not our function to make findings of fact 
because this Court does not have the advantage of 
seeing and hearing witnesses testify. On review, 
this Court views the evidence and all the inferences 
that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light 
most supportive of the trial court's findings. 
Unless clearly erroneous, findings of fact will not 
be set aside. . . . Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 
461 (1987) (citations and quotations omitted). 
In the present case, after holding a hearing on the 
motion and reviewing Memoranda submitted by both parties, the trial 
judge ordered that the charge of Assault by a Prisoner be dismissed. 
ff[F]or the reason that the State failed to retain 
any videotape of the incident at the Salt Lake 
County Jail involving the defendant . . ." 
(R. 41, See Addendum B). 
Implicit in this order is a finding that a videotape of the alleged 
assault existed at one time and was later destroyed. 
Based on the record before this Court, the trial court 
had ample evidence to find that a videotape of the incident existed, 
and that finding should therefore not be disturbed on appeal. The 
record supplied by the state establishes that on July 2, 1987, 
shortly after the preliminary hearing, defense counsel filed a 
motion to compel further discovery wherein he specifically requested 
that he be provided with a copy of any videotape of the incident 
(R. 21). The first indication in the record of response by the 
State shows up in a minute entry dated July 31, 1987, where a 
substitute prosecutor informed the Court that the State did not have 
a videotape (R. 24). This minute entry supports the Court's finding 
that the tape was destroyed and offers no probative information as 
to whether a tape was in fact made. 
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On August 7, 1987, the State responded in writing to Ms. 
Jiminez1 motion to compel further discovery, stating in part: 
The video tape of all bookings, including this 
incident was recycled after approximately 72 hours. 
This is a normal procedure used at the Salt Lake 
County Jail. The tape of the incident was erased 
because no request was made to retain the tape and 
absent such a request the tape is always recycled. 
The tape was not intentionally erased or destroyed. 
(R. 28/ See Addendum A.) (emphasis added) 
This response acknowledges that a videotape of the alleged incident 
had been taken, but claims that it was inadvertently destroyed. 
This statement offers the trial court ample evidence by which it 
could find that a videotape of the incident had been made. 
Furthermore, it clarifies that the prior July 31, 1987 minute entry 
reflected a statement by the substitute prosecutor that the tape no 
longer existed, not that it had never been made. 
Only after Ms. Jiminez filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Preserve Evidence, and a Memorandum in support thereof, 
did the State begin to question the existence of the videotape. 
(R. 32) In its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, the prosecutor stated: 
Plaintiff, State of Utah, is largely in agreement 
with the facts as stated by the defendant in her 
motion to dismiss, except it remains uncertain 
whether or not the incident was in fact videotaped 
by the equipment that was operating at the Salt Lake 
County Jail. 
(R. 32). The statement that "it remains uncertain whether a 
videotape of the incident was made" is the first indication of any 
such uncertainty in the record, and is far less adamant than the 
position currently taken on appeal that the "state disputed whether 
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the incident was captured by the video equipment" (See Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 3). Based on the information in the record, in 
particular the prosecutorfs acknowledgement in his response to the 
Motion to Compel Further Discovery that a tape had existed but was 
erased, the trial court had ample evidence to support its finding 
that a tape of the incident had been made and later destroyed. 
The state argues on appeal that Ms. Jiminez did not offer 
evidence to show that a videotape of the incident existed or that 
anyone had viewed it to determine whether the alleged kick was in 
fact filmed. In light of the prosecutor's concession that a 
videotape of the incident was made but later erased (R. 28) such an 
argument is fallacious. Furthermore, the state failed to request 
the preparation of a transcript of the proceedings and, as a result, 
cannot now argue that certain evidence is missing from the record. 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
(1987) provides: 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding 
challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant 
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record 
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion. (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed the need 
for appellant to present the entire record when urging that a 
conclusion below is not supported by the record. 
In [reviewing factual findings], we examine all the 
record evidence, giving "great weight to the 
findings made and the inferences drawn by the trial 
judge" and setting them aside under Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a) only if "clearly erroneous." State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (quoting Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 2585 (1971)). 
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Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987). 
The record before this Court establishes that the 
implicit finding of the trial court that a videotape of the incident 
was made and later destroyed is not clearly erroneous. The State 
conceded that a tape of the incident was made, but later erased and 
cannot now argue with any force, based on an incomplete record, that 
the trial court erred in making such a finding. 
B. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE VIDEOTAPE 
OF THE INCIDENT DENIED MS. JIMINEZ DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
guarantee an accused due process of law. Due process is violated 
where the state fails to preserve evidence which is material to an 
accused's guilt or innocence. State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 
1975). See also State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985). "The 
intent or purpose of the prosecution in destroying the evidence is 
irrelevant.11 State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1305 (Utah 1986). 
Furthermore, destruction of evidence by police is chargeable to the 
prosecutor. Seattle v. Fettig, 519 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Wash. App. 
1974). See also Stewart at 479 ("destruction of evidence by those 
charged with the prosecution including police officers constitutes a 
violation of due process if the evidence is material to guilt or 
innocence of the defendant in a criminal case (emphasis added)). 
In determining whether evidence which was destroyed was 
vital or material so as to constitute a due process violation, the 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that more than evidentiary 
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materiality is required; the evidence must be "material in 
constitutional sense." State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 
1983). The Utah Supreme Court defined constitutional materiality in 
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985): 
Constitutional materiality requires that there be a 
showing that the suppressed or destroyed evidence is 
vital to the issues of whether the defendant is 
guilty of the charge and whether there is a 
fundamental unfairness that requires the Court to 
set aside the defendant's conviction. 
In Lovato, the Utah Supreme Court further explained that 
evidence is material "in the constitutional sense" where there is 
more than a "mere possibility". . . that the evidence "might have 
affected the outcome of the trial." See Lovato at 1305. 
The videotape in the instant case was "material in the 
constitutional sense" because it would show directly whether Ms. 
Jiminez kicked the officer and therefore would not only affect the 
outcome, but would be dispositive of the question of whether 
Ms. Jiminez was guilty of the crime charged. 
In People v. Harmes, 560 P.2d 470 (Colo. App. 1976), the 
Colorado Court of Appeals found a denial of due process in a factual 
situation substantially similar to the instant case. In Harmes, the 
state alleged that the defendant intentionally kicked a police 
officer after having been taken to the jail on another charge. 
Defense counsel requested that a videotape which had been taken of 
the incident be provided. The tape had been destroyed in the 
interim, and the defendant moved for a dismissal. The trial court 
denied the motion, but the Court of appeals found a due process 
violation and reversed. The Harmes court stated: 
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The materiality of the destroyed videotape cannot be 
questioned. Had it been preserved, it likely would 
have conclusively established defendant's innocence 
or guilt. . . . [T]he people urge that defendant's 
inability to demonstrate that the videotape was 
favorable to the defense thus defeats his claim of 
denial of due process. They also contend that the 
testimony of the arresting officers that the film 
supported their account of the incident, coupled 
with the proffered testimony of another officer who 
purportedly viewed the film, was sufficient to 
establish its inculpatory character. We do not 
agree. 
Where, as here, crucial material evidence is 
wholly destroyed by the prosecution, and the 
responsibility for such destruction cannot properly 
be imputed to the defense, any requirement that 
defendant somehow demonstrate that the evidence was 
exculpatory becomes an absurdity, and is not 
imposed. . . . 
An assertion by the very agency responsible for 
the negligent or otherwise destruction of evidence 
regarding its alleged content, especially where the 
destroyed evidence pertained to an offense allegedly 
perpetrated against a member of that agency, is 
insufficient to cure the damage resulting from 
defendant having been deprived of its use in the 
preparation of his defense. 
Harmes at 474 (citations omitted). See also Seattle v. Fettig, 519 
P.2d 1002 (Wash. App. 1974); State v. Boyd, 629 P.2d 930 (Wash. 
1981); Farrell v. State, 317 So.2d 142 (Fla. App. 1978). 
As the Harmes Court pointed out, requiring a defendant to 
establish that evidence held and subsequently destroyed by the 
prosecution was exculpatory is an "absurdity" since a defendant 
without possession of the destroyed videotape would be incapable of 
ever establishing its content. Harmes at 474. 
In its opening brief at 7, the State attempted to 
distinguish Harmes by arguing that in that case "at the preliminary 
hearing, defense counsel was told that the tape would be preserved 
and presented as evidence against Harmes. . . and that "[t]he 
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Colorado Supreme Court [sic] reversed Harmes1 conviction stating 
that the tape was known to be material and critical, and not merely 
incidental to the question of Harmes1 guilt or innocence[.]" 
(citations omitted). 
A review of the facts in the instant case shows that the 
Statefs "distinction" is meaningless. While counsel for Harmes was 
told at the preliminary hearing that a tape existed and would be 
held by police, in the instant case, the prosecutor conceded in his 
response to the Motion to Compel Discovery that a tape of the 
incident had existed (R. 28). In addition, since a transcript of 
the proceedings was not prepared, the fact that defense counsel was 
informed at the preliminary hearing that a videotape of the incident 
existed is not apparent in the record before this court.1 
Implicit in its order in the instant case, the trial 
court not only made a finding of fact that a videotape of the 
alleged incident was made and later destroyed (See discussion infra 
at 3-7), but also a conclusion that the videotape was "material in a 
constitutional sense." Such a conclusion can be disturbed on appeal 
only upon a determination by this Court that the conclusion was 
clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; State 
v. DePlonty. 
1
 However, the filing of the motion to compel further discovery 
following the preliminary hearing suggests that the state had 
supplied defense counsel with information at the preliminary hearing 
that a videotape of the incident existed. 
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The state argues that Ms. Jiminez did not establish that 
the tape was material by failing to establish that anyone viewed the 
tape before it was erased and therefore ffno one knows what was on 
the tape, if anything, that was relevant to defendant's defense". 
Appellantfs Opening Brief at 5. Such a statement is fallacious for 
three reasons. First, as previously outlined, the incident was 
allegedly comprised of a single kick in the booking area, and the 
prosecutor acknowledged that a videotape of the incident had been 
made (R. 28). The prosecutor's concession obviates the need for 
establishing through other evidence that the incident was filmed. 
Second, the Court's ruling makes an implicit finding that 
the incident was filmed and the videotape was "material in a 
constitutional sense," and the State has failed to offer anything in 
the record which would establish that the trial court's decision was 
erroneous. The Harmes Court stated that the testimony of the 
officers involved in the incident that the film confirmed their 
version of the incident was not sufficient "to cure the damage 
resulting from defendant having been deprived of its use in the 
preparation of his defense." Harmes at 474. The evidence in the 
instant case did not rise to the level of that in Harmes since the 
state did not offer testimony that the videotape was inculpatory and 
fails to suggest any evidentiary basis for a determination that the 
decision of the trial court was erroneous. 
Finally, as the Harmes Court pointed out, a defendant 
without access to the evidence would never be able to establish the 
exact content of a videotape and to require him to do so "becomes an 
absurdity". Harmes at 474. Ms. Jiminez, or any other person 
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accused of assaulting a police officer is incapable of establishing 
the content of a videotape of the alleged incident where the officer 
or the agency for which he works has possession of the videotape and 
destroys it, negligently or otherwise. The State's argument in the 
instant case that Ms. Jiminez failed to establish that someone 
viewed the tape and failed to establish that the tape was 
exculpatory is precisely the type of "absurdity" focused on by the 
Harmes Court. 
In addition, requiring Ms. Jiminez to defend herself 
without the tape, the most accurate and unbiased evidence of the 
event, would be fundamentally unfair. The only evidence supporting 
the charge was the testimony of police officers. As the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized, police officers are "engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" which may 
cause their actions or testimony to be more subjective in nature. 
See generally, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
Where an officer is the alleged victim of the crime, the bias and 
subjectivity of the officers' testimony is likely to increase. 
Hence, the videotape is material under both of the definitions set 
forth in Lovato: the tape is vital to the issues and requiring 
Ms. Jiminez to proceed without it would be fundamentally unfair. 
In the decisions by the Utah Supreme Court where that 
Court has found that destroyed evidence was not material, evidence 
other than the officer's testimony supporting the charge existed, 
and the evidence which was destroyed was merely cumulative. In 
State v. Stewart, the actual marijuana purchased by the officer was 
introduced into evidence and therefore evidence supporting the 
- 12 -
charge other than the officers' testimony existed and the 
destruction of the tape recording did not violate the defendant's 
due process rights. In Nebeker, the destruction of a photo array in 
which the defendant's photograph did not appear was tangential and 
cumulative to the case and therefore did not amount to a due process 
violation, in Lovato, the destruction of a knife did not violate 
due process because its existence was not disputed, the description 
of the knife was detailed and the defense argued that no knife was 
used, not that the particular knife was not used, in addition, the 
defendant in Lovato was unable to demonstrate a fundamental 
unfairness resulting from the destruction of the knife. 
Finally, in Shaffer the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
destruction of the victim's body after the state medical examiner 
performed an autopsy and determined that the cause of death was 
homicide did not violate due process since potential evidence of 
gunshot residue on the victim's hands would not have been vital to 
the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant. In Shaffer, 
there was evidence from the medical examiner and police officers 
that in their opinion the cause of death was homicide. The medical 
examiner testified that even if the hands of the victim showed 
gunshot residue, his opinion as to cause of death would be the 
same. Hence, the Court determined in Shaffer that the test for 
gunshot residue was insignificant to the case. 
Cases cited by the state in its opening brief at 5 are 
similarly distinguishable. None of the cases involved a videotape 
of the entire incident, and evidence other than the testimony of a 
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victim officer existed. In People v. Roblas, 568 P.2d 57 (Colo. 
1977), the audio tape which was destroyed contained an interview of 
one of the defendants (who became a key prosecution witness) in a 
homicide case, and unlike the present case, did not record the 
entire incident. Five witnesses to the taped interview, as well as 
the prosecution's key witness (who was the subject of the interview) 
were willing to testify to the details of the initial interview and 
the change in stories by the prosecution witness to a version which 
was less favorable to the defendants. Because the audiotape 
contained only an interview of a witness and numerous witnesses were 
able to reconstruct the details of that interview, and because 
additional evidence supporting the charge of homicide against the 
defendant existed, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's decision and allowed the prosecution witness to testify even 
though the tape of his initial interview was destroyed. 
In People v. Holloway, 649 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1982), also 
cited by the State in its opening brief, the Colorado Supreme Court 
held that the defendant's due process rights were violated where the 
description of an alleged burglar was broadcast by officers and the 
police dispatch tapes of that broadcast were subsequently 
destroyed. The state's reliance on Holloway in support of the 
statement that "[w]here there are eyewitnesses who are available and 
would be subject to cross-examination, destruction of a possibly 
corroborative tape does not attain constitutional dimensions" 
(Appellant's Opening Brief at 5) is therefore incorrect. The 
Holloway Court reversed the decision of the trial court because 
although the destruction of the tape violated due process, the 
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defendant was not prejudiced because persons who overheard the 
broadcast were available to testify and the officer who had seen the 
burglar could "be fully examined as to his opportunity to view the 
burglar and the accuracy of his broadcast description (citations 
omitted)11 Holloway at 320. The dispatch tape was merely cumulative 
evidence, and did not encompass the entire incident as did the 
videotape in the instant case. 
Unlike any of the cases cited by Appellant other than 
Harmes, the destroyed videotape in the instant case captured the 
entire incident (R. 28) and would have been dispositive of the issue 
as to whether Ms. Jiminez assaulted the officer. The video tape was 
therefore material, and its destruction deprived Ms. Jiminez of due 
process of law as guaranteed by the Utah and United States 
Constitutions, resulting in prejudice to her since she was unable to 
adequately prepare her defense and left with the subjective 
testimony of officers with an interest in the outcome as the only 
evidence against her. The state has presented no evidence in the 
record to show that decision of the trial court that the videotape 
was material in a constitutional sense and resulted in prejudice to 
Ms. Jiminez, thereby requiring dismissal was clearly erroneous; 
therefore, the decision of the trial court must be upheld on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Jiminez, by and through 
counsel, requests this court to affirm the trial court's order of 
dismissal. 
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DATED this II day of March, 1988. 
JAflES C. BRADSHAW ^ ^ 
:torney for Appellant 
<rtto- <• uhzf 
JOAN C . WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah court of Appeals, 230 
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and four 
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this II day of March, 1988. 
DELIVERED by 
March, 1988. 
this day of 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JESSIE JIMENEZ, 
Defendant, 
STATEfS ANSWER TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
Case No. CR 87-777 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Comes now the Plaintiff by and thru Ernie Jones, Deputy 
County Attorney and answers the Defendant's discovery as follows: 
1. The video tape of all bookings, including this 
incident was recycled after approximately 72 hours. This is a 
normal procedure used at the Salt Lake County Jail. The tape of 
the incident was erased because no request was made to retain the 
tape and absent such a request the tape is always recycled. The 
tape was not intentionally erased or destroyed. 
2. Plaintiff is not aware of any investigation conducted 
by Salt Lake City Police Department Internal Affairs Division into 
States Answers to Defendant's 
Motion for Additional Discovery 
CR 87-777 
Page 2 
alleged physical abuse of citizens by Officer Michael Beesley, 
DATED this 7th day of August, 1987. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
'/f/f?^ \/:^XJL^ 
INIE JONES 
Deputy County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of August, 1987, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing States Answer to 
Defendant's Motion for Additional Discovery to James C. Bradshaw, 
Attorney for Defendant, at the address stated below. 
:retary O Secret
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Legal Defender Association 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Deputy County Attorney ~ 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JESSIE JIMENEZ, -Q^ 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. CR 87-777 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
The defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to preserve 
evidence came on for hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on 
the 21st day of August, 1987. The defendant was present and 
represented by James Bradshaw. The State was represented by Ernie 
Jones, Deputy County Attorney. The Court having heard the argument 
of counsel and having read the brief of both parties grants the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge of Assault by a 
Prisoner pursuant to $76-5-102.5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended is dismissed for the reason that the State failed to retain 
VJ •«• u KJ ' \ ^ 
Order of Dismissal 
CR 87-777 
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any video tape of the incident at the Salt Lake County Jail 
involving the defendant on March 13, p.987. 
DATED this 
BY THE COURT: 
198 ,
£j day of Juflubt,- 1987. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this StV day of August-; 1987, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal 
to James Bradshaw, Attorney for Defendant, at the address stated 
below. 
CW$ \ "fcrcre 
Secretary \j 
JAMES BRADSHAW 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Legal Defenders Association 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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